As the prevalence of Alzheimer's disease (AD) grows, so do the costs it imposes on society. Scientif c, clinical, and f nancial interests have focused current drug discovery ef orts largely on the single biological pathway that leads to amyloid deposition. This ef ort has resulted in slow progress and disappointing outcomes. Here, we describe a "portfolio approach" in which multiple distinct drug development projects are undertaken simultaneously. Although a greater upfront investment is required, the probability of at least one success should be higher with "multiple shots on goal," increasing the ef ciency of this undertaking. However, our portfolio simulations show that the risk-adjusted return on investment of parallel discovery is insuf cient to attract private-sector funding. Nevertheless, the future cost savings of an ef ective AD therapy to Medicare and Medicaid far exceed this investment, suggesting that government funding is both essential and f nancially benef cial.
Despite the rapidly growing prevalence of Alzheimer's disease (AD) and its related costs-which are expected to dominate medical care by 2030-progress in the development of AD therapeutics has been unacceptably slow. More than 5 million Americans now suf er from AD, and that number is expected to more than double by 2050 (1) . Between 1998 and 2011, there were 101 unsuccessful AD drugs in development and only three approvals (none since 2003) (2) . T e U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has approved only f ve AD drugs, and these treat the symptoms of the disease without altering its course. Substantial resources have focused on the build-up of β-amyloid protein in AD brains. Half a dozen costly phase 3 trials designed around the so-called amyloid hypothesis have failed to meet their primary end points, including the high-prof le bapineuzumab and solanezumab trials completed in 2012 (3, 4) . Although focus has shif ed to exploring anti-amyloid treatments at earlier stages of the disease, the ultimate outcome of such therapies remains unclear. T us, it is essential to explore other aspects of AD pathophysiology, which could provide additional therapeutic targets (Table 1) .
T e cost and complexity of AD clinical trials implies that any single drug-development program represents an enormous f nancial risk to its investors. Here, we describe a portfolio approach-the "megafund" model set forth by Fernandez et al. (5)-in which multiple distinct AD drug development projects ready for testing are undertaken in parallel. Although this approach requires greater upfront investment than does a single-target approach, the probability of at least one success will be considerably higher with "multiple shots on goal, " mitigating the risk and increasing the attractiveness of this undertaking to-and the amount of funding provided by-the private sector. More importantly, conducting parallel clinical trials reduces the expected waiting time for a success, substantially reducing the enormous taxpayer burden of caring for AD patients. If a single drug-development program takes 13 years from beginning to end and has a 5% probability of success, the expected waiting time for the next approved AD drug is 260 years if each trial is independently and identically distributed and conducted sequentially (f g. S1). In comparison, a portfolio approach is a more systematic, less risky, and thus economically more viable way of achieving the U.S. National Plan objective to "prevent and ef ectively treat Alzheimer's disease by 2025. "
PARALLEL DISCOVERY
Parallel drug discovery begins with delineating and prioritizing the most compelling scientif c hypotheses about disease mechanisms and pathophysiology. Until recently, most AD hypotheses emerged from analysis of post-mortem AD brains, in which prominent amyloid plaques and neurof brillary tangles implicated the amyloid and tau pathways (6) . Converging biochemical and genetic data supporting the importance of amyloid has largely overshadowed other compelling targets; additional basic science insights could catapult these targets into therapeutic development. For example, agents that target tau-derived neurof brillary tangles and neuroinf ammation are leading alternatives to anti-amyloid therapeutics but are the subject of far fewer research projects and clinical trials. In addition, a wealth of attractive starting points for drug discovery is now emerging from genomic data sets (7), gene expression data (8) , and statistical genetics (9) that assess large AD populations for genes that point to dysregulated biological pathways and confer risk.
A systematic and strategic ef ort to identify, prioritize, and categorize preclinical pathways that culminates with lead compounds for each hypothesis category could generate a portfolio with suf cient depth and broad scientif c support to justify multiple simultaneous clinical trials. Furthermore, emerging scientif c data will be used to continue to ref ne the preclinical leads in the AD portfolio.
PUBLIC-PRIVATE COLLABORATION
Although the megafund model requires substantial upfront investment (an estimated $38.4 billion over the next decade), the higher probability of success relative to a single-target approach mitigates risk and increases the attractiveness of this undertaking to-and the amount of funding available from-the private sector. But investing in multiple shots on goal is challenging from both scientif c and f nancial perspectives. T e required number of shots depends on the probability of success of each shot. With a 5% success rate among independent trials, 100 or more shots may be needed to yield an attractive investment; this requires $50 billion and the identif cation of nearly twice as many potential therapeutic targets than we currently have. T erefore, despite its enormous societal value, the economic incentives for developing an ef ective AD therapy in the private sector are considerably lower than for cancer, diabetes, and heart disease, each of which has successful drugs that target more than one disease pathway. Accordingly, we need new creative methods for f nancing translational medicine research in the AD arena.
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alone are expected to be $150 billion (1) . Taxpayers would enjoy substantial cost savings from therapies that delay AD onset or slow disease progression (10) . Moreover, the U.S. government is in the singular position of being one of the most risk-tolerant and longest-horizon investors in the world and, currently, the investor with the lowest borrowing cost. T us, large-scale government involvement is both essential and f nancially benef cial (from the taxpayer's perspective).
QUALIFYING PORTFOLIO PROJECTS
A prerequisite for large-scale private-or public-sector funding for AD therapeutics is a strategic approach to identifying and vetting leads for a megafund portfolio. AD has the potential to bankrupt the medical system, and if taxpayers assume the burden for drug discovery, the public's interests must be protected by prioritizing projects in a systematic manner. What properties qualify a project for inclusion in the portfolio? Megafund projects should represent a diversity of disease hypotheses, meet def ned thresholds for preclinical evidence, target well-characterized disease-pathway mediators that, when modulated, can modify disease outcomes, and have a newly discovered or repurposed drug in the pipeline, ready for clinical trials. Using these considerations, we identif ed 12 leading pathway hypotheses for developing AD therapeutics (Table 1) . A well-devel-" " oped hypothesis (for example, amyloid, tau, and neuroinf ammation) typically contains multiple categories, which in turn may contain multiple projects, with each "project" def ning the clinical development of an individual AD therapy. T e extent to which one can develop multiple dif erentiated drug candidates within the context of a single disease hypothesis depends on how extensively the hypothesis has been characterized and the potential diversity of drug-development approaches to test the hypothesis. For example, amyloid-based therapeutics include antibodies to amyloid-β, small-molecule inhibitors of amyloid-β biosynthetic pathways, and protein-disaggregating agents. Each therapeutic antibody displays distinct af nities for amyloid-β oligomers and has dif erent propensities for side ef ects such as amyloid-related imaging abnormalitiesedema (ARIA-E) (11) . T erefore, certain entries in Table 1 such as amyloid-β antibodies and both γ-secretase inhibitors and modulators can support multiple projects (6 and 3 projects, respectively, which is indicated in parentheses). However, for hypotheses that are still speculative (such as epigenetics-modifying HDAC inhibitors), we propose one project for each, with the expectation that as these speculations turn into hard scientif c evidence, more projects will be generated. T e sources for these projects include the extensive AD literature, informal communication with scientists in the f eld, and a review of AD-and dementia-related clinical trials registered at clinicaltrials.gov. Some projects are more speculative than others, but all of the entries in Table 1 are either direct targets of an AD drug in development or display mechanisms of action consistent with a potential AD therapeutic. T erefore, all are plausible candidates for parallel discovery in the near term. Of course, all entries do not hold equal promise; we made an attempt to dif erentiate among them by specifying a "degree of validation" based on a subjective review of the evidence. Achieving success in modifying any given pathway would justify investing additional resources in prosecuting that pathway.
T e identif cation of 64 projects may suggest an unintentional and false sense of precision in the candidate selection process. Depending on how broadly or narrowly a project is def ned, the total number may be greater or fewer. For example, the number of targets within a project can multiply rapidly because pathology is the result of a complex cascade of molecular events with multiple control points. In fact, the amyloid-β pathway alone could generate a larger number of targets via its numerous collateral production and degradation pathways, as well as its many oligomeric forms. T us Table 1 serves as a broad but concrete and actionable starting point for a dialogue among the scientif c, clinical, and f nancial communities for developing a systematic approach to parallel discovery for AD therapeutics. Our hope is that this list will be continuously ref ned by the various stakeholders of the AD community over time and as clinical data accumulate.
A new business model will also be required to support the management of a complex portfolio. Pharmaceutical company portfolios are subject to shareholders and have strong economic incentives to reduce earnings volatility by shi% ing corporate assets away from risky early-stage R&D toward later-stage acquisitions and licensing deals. Small biotech companies must answer to venture capitalists looking for exits, and next-round f nancing opportunities o% en drive the scientif c research agenda rather than the reverse. Neither of these business models is capable of supporting an AD megafund. We hypothesize that the ideal megafund business model will be a new hybrid of a drug-royalty investment company (for late-stage assets), a biotech venture-capital fund (for early-stage clinical assets), and a multiproject platform such as the NIH's National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences (NCATS). AD portfolio management must also implement innovative clinical trial designs; state-of-the-art patient enrollment criteria (such as patient stratif cation by biomarkers and genotype); expanded enrollment searches through community-based "brain shops" (12); Internet-based screening; and a national institutional review board for AD clinical trials (13) . On the basis of recent and ongoing management research (14-16), we believe that a collective ef ort among biopharma stakeholders-venture capitalists, pharma industry leaders, f nancial engineers, patient advocacy groups, and philanthropists-is both necessary and suf cient to successfully launch and manage an AD megafund.
AD MEGAFUND SIMULATION
Fernandez et al. (5) have described a megafund f nancing structure that uses securitization, a common f nancial engineering technique in which bonds are issued and sold to investors, and the proceeds from those sales are used to purchase a portfolio of assets-in this case, drug targets and other therapeutics. T e portfolio's assets serve as collateral for the bondholders and generate cash f ows used to pay the bonds' interest and principal. Any remaining cash is paid to the megafund's equityholders. If the cash f ows are insuf cient to meet these obligations, megafund bonds will default, and the collateral will be transferred to bondholders through standard bankruptcy proceedings. T erefore, a megafund can only issue bonds if the underlying assets are suff ciently de-risked. In the specif c context of oncology, the authors simulate the investment returns of a large portfolio of drugdevelopment projects and conclude that funding multiple projects simultaneously can reduce risk to the point at which such megafunds can issue debt as well as equity. T e ability to issue debt is critical because bonds markets have much larger capacity than those of venture capital, private equity, or public equity markets, and greater access to capital allows the megafund to reach its critical threshold of diversif cation.
We applied this portfolio approach to AD drug development by analyzing the hypothetical investment returns of a portfolio of 64 AD drug-development programs, each of which targets a dif erent pathway or mechanism of action [see supplementary materials (SM)]. T e analysis relied on several assumptions and parameters, including the cost of drug development, the length of time from phase 1 clinical trials to the f ling of a new drug or biologics license application [New Drug Application (NDA) or Biologics License Application (BLA)], each project's probability of success, and pairwise correlations of success among the projects in the portfolio. Unlike oncology, which has many approved drugs and even more under development, there are currently only four approved AD drugs on the market, implying a paucity of data with which to calibrate our simulations. T erefore, our experimental design is more simplistic than that of (5). In setting our simulation parameters, we relied on generic information regarding the drug-development process and qualitative input from scientists with domain-specif c expertise.
Specif cally, the present value of out-ofpocket development costs for each of the 64 projects in the portfolio was set to $600 million, the sum of $100 million in ba-" " sic research funding and $500 million for clinical development (17) over a 13-year period. T e 13-year duration is supported by a recent study commissioned by the New York Academy of Sciences (18) focused on AD therapeutics. T ese f gures assume trials with mild-to-moderate AD patients and standard progression from phase to phase; if earlier stages of AD are investigated or a trial must be repeated, costs and duration will increase and post-approval patent life will decrease. On the other hand, because we do not model the transition from one clinical phase to the next, the realized outof-pocket cost of a typical project could be less than our assumed $600 million because of early termination of failed projects. For simplicity, we have chosen a value for outof-pocket costs that falls between a range of higher (multiphase) and lower (early-phase failure) cost estimates, which is in line with industry estimates of the total development cost for a successful AD therapeutic (range, $500 million to $2 billion and beyond) (17) .
At $600 million per project, the megafund of 64 projects requires $38.4 billion. To estimate the returns generated by such a portfolio, we assumed the annual prof t of a successful AD therapy to be $2 billion for a 10-year period of exclusivity a% er FDA approval (at year 13) (Fig. 1) . Although a 20-year patent life implies only 7 years of exclusivity a% er a 13-year therapeutic-development period, patent-protection extensions and data exclusivity provided by the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 and the Orphan Drug Act of 1983 allow somewhat longer periods of exclusivity. Our assumption of $2 billion in annual prof ts is a plausible estimate based on net global sales for Namenda-the only approved AD drug still under patent-which is intended to treat moderate to severe stages of the disease. Despite its decline in sales volume due to changes in prescribing behavior in long-term care settings and its negligible ef ect on the course of the disease, Forest Laboratories reported Namenda's net sales for the year ending on 31 March 2013 to be greater than $1.5 billion (19) . In addition, estimated peak sales of potential anti-amyloid biologics such as solanezumab are expected to reach major market sales of $5.5 billion in 2022, if approved (20) . Using a 10% cost of capital for discounting these prof ts, we obtain a net present value of $12.3 billion upon approval in year 13.
If a $600 million investment in year 0 produces a drug worth $12.3 billion in year 13, this represents a compound annual rate of return of ($12.3/$0.6) 1/13 − 1 = 26.1% over the 13-year development period. Of course, this attractive prospect is highly speculative and must be weighed against the possibility of a total loss if the project fails. T erefore, an assessment of the megafund's return requires estimates of the probability of success for each of the 64 portfolio projects and pairwise correlation of success among all 2016 dif erent pairs. T ese parameter estimates were provided by two of the authors with domain-specif c expertise (K.S.K. and C.H.). Our f gures for the probabilities of success are based on estimates of the compounded probabilities of advancement from phase 1 to NDA or BLA f ling. From recently reviewed industry data on neurology product phase transitions from 2003 to 2011 (largely composed of pain and psychiatric compounds), the probability of approval and the launch of a neurologically active drug at the start of a phase 1 study is 9%, and 15% at the start of phase 2, with the probability increasing to 50% at the start of phase 3 (21) .
Given that the probability of success in pain and psychiatry may be higher than in neurodegeneration, we used lower probability estimates for AD targets in general. Probabilities of success were translated to high, medium, and low degrees of validation (Table 1) , corresponding to probability estimates of 11 to 15%, 6 to 10%, and 1 to 5%, respectively. Pairwise correlations were qualitatively assessed as low, moderate, medium, or high, and these qualitative assessments were assigned numerical values of 10, 25, 50, and 90%, respectively. For example, we assumed the pairwise correlations of multiple projects within a single entry in Table 1 to be high. Figure 2 shows a heat map of these assumed correlations; the actual correlation matrix used in our analysis was the closest positive def nite correlation matrix to the one shown Fig. 2 (see also f g. S2 and S3).
Unlike an oncology megafund (5) or a much smaller orphan-disease megafund (22) , which yield attractive expected returns at tolerable risk levels, the simulated investment performance of an AD megafund is mixed, with negative-to-mediocre expected-returns for higher success probabilities and lower correlations, and highly negative expected-returns for lower success probabilities and higher correlations (tables S1 and S2). For example, with a 5% probability of success, even in the absence of pairwise correlation among the 64 drug development programs, the expected return is −4.2%, and the return standard deviation is 19.4%.
On the other hand, with a 15% probability of success and no correlation, the expected return is 8.6%, with a return standard deviation of only 2.8%, which is a riskadjusted expected return that exceeds those of most professionally managed investment funds over the past decade. But even with such a high probability of success, as the pairwise correlation among the projects increases, the expected returns decline and the volatility increases. At 80% pairwise correlation, the expected return becomes −38.6% with a volatility of 48.4%, which is comparable to the worst-performing investment funds over the past decade. Yet the most sobering results involve parameters closest to reality (both in terms of individually calibrated probabilities of success and pairwise correlations); this case yields an expected return of −14.3%, a standard deviation of 33.4%, and a 13% probability that no project will reach NDA or BLA, implying that debt f nancing will be virtually impossible.
With such risk/reward prof les-which follow from our current understanding of AD translational research-a private-sector AD megafund is simply not economically viable. T ese results may well explain why no AD drug has been approved over the past decade: T ere has been an insuf cient number of shots on goal because of a lack of economic incentives. T e fact that AD therapeutics take so much longer to develop than do many other types of drugs implies that 20-year f xed patent terms are less valuable and pharma will be less motivated to invest (23) .
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
T e mediocre investment returns of an AD megafund are counterintuitive given the prevalence of the disease and how much is currently being spent to address it. T e explanation lies in the nature of the disease and its implications for the economics of drug discovery. Investigation of an AD target is expensive, lengthy, and risky, even by biopharmaceutical industry standards; hence, a $2 billion-a-year compound over a 13-year period of patent protection-a blockbuster drug by any other measureis insuf cient to recoup the costs of a suff ciently de-risked AD megafund. Unless more scientif c progress is made so that the probability of success is higher, the correlation among projects is lower, and more shots on goal become available, the private sector seems unlikely to produce ef ective AD therapies over the next few decades.
Given the burden of AD on society, governments around the world have strong incentives to invest heavily in AD therapeutics. A common approach to such policy decisions is to weigh the costs and benef ts of public spending on AD (see SM). Although the costs are fairly clear-$38.4 billion, for example-the benef ts are considerably more dif cult to estimate for a variety of reasons. For easily diagnosed terminal illnesses such as pancreatic cancer, the benef t of life-saving and life-extending therapeutics can be evaluated by using standard economic measures of the value of a statistical life (VSL). For example, the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) current VSL estimate used in its policy decisions is $7. Another standard measure of benef t in public health policy contexts is a consumer's "willingness to pay" (WTP) for a particular therapy or outcome. For example, a recent evaluation of the economic return from the "War on Cancer" estimated that the average WTP for the 4-year survival gains that cancer patients achieved between 1988 and 2000 is $322,000 per patient, implying roughly $1.9 trillion of additional social value and an excellent return on investment, particularly from the patient perspective (24) . Unfortunately, because much less is known about AD and because existing drugs treat only certain symptoms, eliciting a consumer's WTP for nonexistent therapies is highly speculative. Moreover, the burden of AD is not only imminent death but cognitive and functional impairment, loss of dignity and self-control, and the indirect toll-both emotional and f nancial-on family members and caregivers. Accordingly, survival rates and life-years are not the most relevant measures of benef t because the typical QALY scale implicitly assumes that there is nothing worse than death, which is not necessarily the case for diseases that cause extended periods of suf ering such as AD (25) . Moreover, the organic unawareness of def cits (anosognosia) renders AD patients unreliable reporters of their own conditions (25), including their WTP. Surveying presymptomatic subjects may not solve the problem because such subjects may underestimate their chances of being af icted, and risk perception and risk tolerance can signif cantly bias WTP estimates (26) . For these reasons, WTP and related costef ciency studies of AD therapeutics are dif cult to conduct and their f ndings are equally dif cult to interpret. For example, one cost-benef t analysis of the early identifcation and treatment of AD reports net social benef ts ranging from $10,000 to $172,000 for a 70-year-old patient, depending on the hypothetical drug's ability to reduce cognitive impairment (27) . However, a more recent WTP study using retrospective Health and Retirement Survey data estimates the mean WTP to prevent AD altogether to be $155 per month, but these WTP estimates varied signif cantly with the respondents' household wealth and perceived risk of developing AD (28) . An extensive prospective telephone survey of 1240 Swiss subjects was conducted to estimate WTP for three hypothetical AD intervention programs-easing the burden on caregivers, early detection of AD, and intensifying research to cure AD-using three dif erent statistical techniques, yielding a matrix of nine measures (29) . T e s e m e asures range from $256 to $323 per year for caregiver relief, $184 to $202 for early detection, and $192 to $225 for research to cure AD (assuming an exchange rate of $1.12 per Swiss franc).
Given the challenges of WTP measures, we take a narrower and more practical approach by focusing on the potential impact of AD therapeutics on M&M expenditures because the U.S. government may have an incentive to invest heavily in AD therapeutics in the best interests of its taxpayers. Of course, cost savings do not necessarily translate into net benef ts to society because they may come at the expense of other stakeholders (for example, reducing M&M expenditures on AD may increase unemployment among AD caregivers). However, potential cost savings may still serve as a useful measure of the f rst-order benef ts of ef ective AD therapies, a% er which indirect ef ects can be calculated separately.
To estimate the potential cost savings realized by M&M from a new, ef ective AD therapy, we relied on the Alzheimer's Association's (AA's) (10) detailed projections of the current trajectory of AD-related expenditures (CT) assuming no new AD therapies and transition rates of 45% from mild to moderate AD and 28% from moderate to severe AD. T ese hypothetical trajectories are assumed to begin taking ef ect in 2015, and the AA model provides projections every 5 years through 2050. We compared AA's trajectories with those of two hypothetical scenarios: delaying the onset of AD by 5 years ("trajectory 2, " or T2) or slowing down its progression ("trajectory 3, " or T3) so that 10% of AD patients transition from mild to moderate stages of the disease each year and 5% transition from moderate to severe stages.
By assuming that these projected costs are constant each year until the next 5-year projection, we computed conservative present values of these annual expenditures over 10-, 20-, and 30-year horizons (Table 2) . T e potential cost savings of new AD therapeutics can then be computed by taking the dif erence of the present values of CT and each of the two counterfactual trajectories. T e last two rows of Table 2 show that the potential cost savings to M&M are substantial (detailed calculations in SM; see also tables S3 and S4): $1.5 trillion for T2 and $813 billion for T3 over a 30-year period (both in 2010 dollars). Using the AD megafund's probability of at least one success as a proxy for the likelihood of T2 and T3, we computed the expected return and volatility that the cost savings (Table  2 ) represent relative to the initial investment of $38.4 billion in the megafund (or $35.9 billion in 2010 dollars) ( Table 3) . T e results conf rm the intuition that an ef ective AD therapy is of tremendous economic value when measured by the potential cost savings it can produce. For example, even with only a 5% probability of success and a 10% correlation among the megafund's 64 projects, the expected annualized return of T2 is 2.6, 13.8, and 19.5% over 10-, 20-, and 30-year horizons, respectively. With standard deviations of 35.0, 38.8, and 40.7%, respectively, for these three horizons, the risks are high but comparable with the stock-return volatilities of many publicly traded companies. T e riskreward prof les of T3 are qualitatively similar, although somewhat less attractive because of the less ambitious hypothesis of slowed progression.
However, the most practically relevant results are the performance statistics contained in the last row of Table 3 , which corresponds to the most realistically calibrated parameter values. In this case, T2's expected annualized return of −0.4% and standard deviation of 38.5% for a 10-year horizon are unattractive; but for a 30-year horizon, the expected annualized return is 16.0%, and the standard deviation is 44.8%, which is Table 2 . Costs and savings. Present values (in billions of 2010 constant dollars) of annual ADrelated M&M expenses and potential cost savings as estimated by Alzheimer's Association (10) over 10-, 20-, and 30-year horizons under the current trajectory (CT) and two hypothetical scenarios: a delayed-onset trajectory (T2) and a slowed-progression trajectory (T3). A 10% nominal cost of capital and a 5% infl ation rate were used to discount the real cost estimates. " " considerably more compelling. For T3, the corresponding expected return and volatility are −2.6 and 37.6%, respectively, over a 10-year horizon, and 10.6 and 42.8% over a 30-year horizon. Given that the AA model's projections are based entirely on inf ationadjusted 2010 dollars, the expected returns (Table 3) are real returns; nominal returns would be even higher. T e signif cant disparity in the expected returns of short-versus long-run horizons may be another reason why so few AD therapeutics have been developed in the past decade-and why government intervention may be benef cial.
ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
Our simulated investment performance statistics are highly speculative and based on hypotheses that are unavoidably imprecise, but they incorporate the most current information available on AD burden. We are spending more than $200 billion to care for the more than 5 million AD patients in the United States, of which an estimated 70% are covered by M&M. In addition, >15 million Americans currently provide unpaid care for people with AD and other dementias, valued at $220 billion (1). If no new drugs are discovered that alter the course of this disease, we are looking at greater than $1 trillion in costs of care and more than 13 million ADaf icted Americans by 2050 (10) . A $38.4 billion AD megafund could plausibly generate double-digit investment returns, but in the form of cost savings to U.S. taxpayers, who are now paying the $150 billion in AD-related M&M expenses for 2014 (1) . Because the government is uniquely positioned to invest in the very-long-term interests of its citizens, and because it is less risk sensitive than individual and institutional investors, it can greatly accelerate the development of AD therapeutics in at least three ways: (i) by providing guarantees for the debt of an AD megafund; (ii) by starting the patent clock upon commercialization rather than invention; (iii) by increasing the duration of patent protection from 20 to 30 years for AD therapeutics that meet a suff ciently high ef cacy threshold; and (iv) by providing more funding for basic research on neurodegenerative diseases-a prerequisite for deciphering new disease pathways, pathophysiological mechanisms, and therapeutic targets to be translated by an AD megafund. T e critical role of government support is underscored by the dif culty in earning reasonable f nancial rates of return on basic research; the output is too uncertain in timing and commercial value to justify private-sector investment. In economic terms, the "market failure" that necessitates the need for government intervention in this case is the outsized risk, cost, and lengthy horizon of developing AD therapeutics.
We have witnessed the impact that government involvement can have in catalyzing subsequent private-sector investment. President Nixon's declaration of the "war on cancer" in 1971 has spurred decades of invaluable basic research, a long-term investment that has only recently begun to bear fruit. With passage of the National Alzheimer's Project Act (NAPA) in January 2011 and the subsequent "National Plan to Address Alzheimer's Disease" (30) , the war on Alzheimer's has only just begun. T e National Plan contains a number of promising (31) , and the Obama administration invested only $50 million (30) . NIH funding for cancer research in the same year was more than $5 billion (31) . Before passage of the National Cancer Act of 1971, the annual budget of the NIH National Cancer Institute (NCI) was $270 million; by FY 1978, NCI's budget exceeded $770 million (32) . T e N A P Aestablished Advisory Council recommended a budget of $2 billion per year to achieve its 2025 goal, but there has been no mention of how this level of funding is to be achieved. T e scale and scope of current ef orts for reducing the AD burden are insuf cient to have material impact on the vast majority of AD patients within the next several decades. A government-sponsored initiative in parallel AD drug discovery-with active participation from the private sector-is both necessary and f nancially benef cial, but we must address the f nancing issues before these benef ts can be realized (33) . Table S1 . AD projects and estimated probabilities of success Table S2 . Returns Cost/benefi t analysis Table S3. Trajectories  Table S4 . Medicare and Medicaid cost savings
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